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Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis has dominated the international economic debate in recent years. It has posed an existential threat for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), largely monopolised the agenda of policy makers and triggered a vast academic literature on the subject. Within the latter, one may distinguish four related but distinct branches. First, theoretical models of the EMU crisis highlighting the role of changes in market expectations as a key driver of the crisis' evolution (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013) . Second, empirical studies investigating the fundamental determinants of EMU long-term government bond yield spreads against Germany. These document significant time-variation in the relationship, specifically a shift from a pre-crisis to a crisis-related bond pricing regime (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012 , Afonso et al. 2014 . Third, the role of banking risk in transforming the global financial crisis of 2008/09 into the sovereign debt crisis, and the nexus between banking risk and sovereign risk (Alter and Schüler, 2012; De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2014) .
Finally, a fourth branch investigates the effectiveness of non-conventional monetary policy actions by the European Central Bank (ECB) to stabilise sovereign bond markets. Most of these studies analyse the Security Markets Programme (SMP) and the effect of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) announcement, while a few more recent papers consider the ECB's Quantitative Easing (QE) programme.
1 They typically find that the ECB policy interventions are associated with lower spreads without, however, identifying the channels via which they affect spreads.
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This paper brings together multiple branches of the literature on the European debt crisis by investigating the hypothesis that the relationship linking spreads with fundamentals is affected by the behaviour of the ECB. In other words, we posit that policy interventions may alter the underlying bond pricing regime. This hypothesis reflects notably the insights from 1 The SMP commenced on May 2010 and involved the purchase of sovereign bonds from euro area periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) during 2010-2011. For studies on the impact of SMP on spreads see, among others, Eser and Schwaab (2013) , Ghysels et al. (2014) and Trebesch and Zettelmeyer (2014) . The OMT was announced on 2 August 2012, following the statement by President Draghi on 26 July 2012 that the "ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro". The technical framework for the OMT was revealed on 6 September 2012 and on the same date the SMP was terminated. Altavilla et al. (2014) evaluate the reaction of spreads to the OMT announcement, while Krishnamurthy et al. (2015) , Szczerbowicz (2015) and Gibson et al. (2016) examine both the SMP and the OMT. The QE programme was announced in January 2015 and is effective since March 2015. It involves the monthly purchase of euro area sovereign bonds, as well as other assets. The impact of QE on spreads is analysed in Altavilla et al. (2015) and De Santis (2016) . 2 An exception is the study of Krishnamurthy et al. (2015) , who decompose the policy impact on sovereign yields into effects via default risk, market segmentation and redenomination risk. They find that default risk and market segmentation are the dominant channels through which the SMP and OMT worked in Italy and Spain, while redenomination risk may have been a policy channel in Spain and Portugal. the theoretical models of the European sovereign debt crisis quoted above. The key prediction of these models relates to the possibility of multiple equilibria in the relationship between spreads and fundamentals. Drawing on models of currency crises (e.g. Obstfeld, 1996) , they predict that the variable determining which of the possible multiple equilibria will eventually prevail is the status of redenomination/default expectations held by the private sector. Under favourable expectations, markets impose small penalties on risk factors, determining spreads at relatively low levels. An adverse shift in expectations results into higher penalties on risk factors and relatively high spread values. The ECB, through its actions and guarantees that it is ready to operate as a lender of last resort, can improve expectations and thereby generate a shift in bond pricing behaviour.
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To explore this hypothesis, we adopt a two-step empirical approach. Fist, we employ a time-varying parameter (TVP) panel econometric methodology to capture changes in the relationship between 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads against Germany and their fundamental determinants (global financial risk, liquidity risk and credit risk). We present results for a panel of ten EMU countries over the period January 1999 to July 2016, as well as its core and periphery countries constituent sub-panels. This part of our analysis extends previous research on the time-varying relationship between spreads and fundamentals, whose samples typically end in 2010/11, into the period following the announcement of the OMT and Quantitative Easing (QE) programmes. Second, we model the series of TVP coefficients estimated for each of the spreads' determinants on a dummy variable capturing the effects of the OMT announcement and empirical measures of ECB monetary policy (conventional and unconventional). To our knowledge, this work is entirely novel in the literature. Moreover, we control for the effects of bank credit risk in the euro area.
With regards the determinants of spreads, we confirm the main finding of previous studies and extend them with a significant new one. Specifically, we document a change in the EMU bond-pricing regime from risk under-pricing before the global financial crisis, where the sensitivity of spreads to fundamentals is zero or near zero, to a regime involving increasingly larger penalties on risk factors and very high spreads. 4 In addition to these two regimes, however, we identify a third pricing regime, triggered by the announcement of the OMT in August 2012 and characterised by a weakening of the link between spreads and their underlying fundamentals. This regime-shift has not been reported in previous studies, except from Delatte et al. (2017) who conclude that it represents a restoration of the first (precrisis/non-crisis) regime, driven by a decline in bank credit risk. We argue, however, that the third regime is new and different from the first one, with the main distinguishing factors being higher spreads relative to the pre-crisis era and a residual redenomination risk in periphery countries, carried over from the second (crisis) regime.
The second part of our analysis provides evidence that the transition from the second regime to the third is determined by factors relating to monetary policy, especially nonconventional interventions. Specifically, we find that the OMT announcement reduced the responsiveness of spreads to their fundamental determinants. Expansions in the ECB balance sheet due to the SMP and QE programmes, also had a similar effect. Finally, we show that the impact of monetary policy on the relationship between spreads and fundamentals can materialise not only directly but also indirectly through reductions in bank credit risk. This is because banking risk affects the sensitivity of spreads to fundamentals, but at the same time is highly driven by non-conventional monetary policy actions.
Our findings are in line with the predictions of theoretical models of the European debt crisis and are intuitively appealing. They suggest that by providing markets with a guarantee that it stands ready to act as a lender of last resort, the ECB managed to improve expectations causing a shift away from the "bad" equilibrium prevailing during the crisis. The direct effect suggests that the OMT and purchases of sovereign bonds in the secondary market reassured investors that the ECB stands ready to prevent the collapse of sovereign bond markets due to existing fiscal liabilities. The indirect effect hints that the ECB reassured markets that sovereigns will not be called upon to finance unsustainable contingent fiscal liabilities originating from extensive bank losses.
Overall, our work is related to several strands of the literature on the European debt crisis and contributes in numerous ways. First, it validates the predictions of multipleequilibria models of the EMU debt crisis. Second, it presents evidence of a new bond-pricing regime following the announcement of OMT, which is different both to the pre-crisis as well as the crisis pricing regimes reported in previous literature. Third, it identifies a two-fold channel, direct and indirect, via which the ECB has stabilised euro area sovereign bond markets. Our paper's main take-home message is that President Draghi's speech on 26 July 2012 announcing the introduction of OMT was a game-changer for the resolution of the crisis. The expansion of the ECB's balance sheet provided extra stimulus towards that direction.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3 respectively discuss our econometric methodology and data. Section 4 presents our empirical findings.
Specifically, section 4.1 estimates TVP panel models capturing the changing relationship between spreads and fundamentals, while section 4.2 investigates the factors that affect the TVP coefficients. Finally, section 5 summarises the paper and offers concluding remarks.
Methodology
In the first stage of our analysis, we model the euro area 10-year government bond yield spreads against Germany using a TVP panel specification. Given Greece's idiosyncratic characteristics, in the baseline estimates, we present results excluding and including this country. 5 Following Li et al. (2011) and Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) , we estimate the following TVP specification:
In equation (1), ! "# denotes 10-year government bond yield spreads, where i = 1…N; t = 1…T; % "# = [% "#,/ , … , % "#,1 ]′ is a vector of k regressors; and ' # = [' #,/ , … , ' #,1 ]′ is a vector of k time-varying coefficients. In line with previous studies (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Afonso et al., 2014) , % "# includes variables measuring global financial risk, liquidity risk and credit risk. ) " captures country fixed effects and , "# a random error term. Fixed effects account for unobserved time-invariant country-specific factors that can affect spreads. 6 The trend function + # denotes time-specific effects. These control for omitted variables that do not vary across countries but evolve over time. The model of Li et al. (2011) is a non-parametric time-varying coefficient panel data model based on previous contributions by Robinson (1989) and Cai (2007) , estimated using the local linear dummy variable (LLDV) approach 5 Unlike the rest of our sample countries, Greece joined the euro in 2001 rather than 1999. Furthermore, since July 2015 Greece has in place capital controls, designed to stabilise the Greek banking system following large deposits withdraws during the period January -June 2015. In addition, Greece is the only country among our sample countries whose sovereign bonds are not part of the QE programme. Finally, as Greece has been the country at the epicentre of the EMU sovereign debt crisis, its spreads and fiscal imbalances are a clear outlier, even when compared with the figures of other EMU periphery countries (see the descriptive statistics in Table  1) . 6 For identification, it is assumed that ) 3 4 "5/ = 0 (Su and Ullah, 2006) and the fixed effects are eliminated in the procedure. which improves the rate of convergence of ' and outperforms the averaged local linear estimate.
As in all non-parametric estimates based on a kernel function, the estimation involves the choice of a bandwidth parameter (denoted by h*), to which the results are typically sensitive.
A lower value for h* reduces the bias involved in the TVP estimates but increases their variance. We set h* = 0.15 using the cross-validation selection method, 7 which is based on the principle of selecting the bandwidth that minimizes the mean squared error of the resulting estimates. 8 Our estimations also account for the "boundary effect" according to which the estimated coefficients are biased at the beginning and end of the estimation sample.
To address this bias, we follow Dai and Sperlich (2010) who propose reducing the bandwidth value at the beginning and end of the sample. We do so using a bandwidth correction parameter value, denoted by ε, equal to 0.08, satisfying the restriction 0 ˂ ε ˂ h*. Finally, for each estimated TVP coefficient we calculate a 95% confidence interval by applying the wild bootstrap method on the estimated residuals of the non-parametric estimated regression, based on 1000 replications. The same bandwidth and boundary effect correction are used, as in the source regression.
In the second stage of our analysis we model each TVP coefficient on an intercept dummy variable capturing the effects of the OMT announcement in August 2012, measures of conventional and unconventional monetary policy, as well as banking risk. Our econometric specification for this part of the analysis is given by equation (2) below:
In equation (2), the dependent variable ' # 7 is the time-series estimated for the TVP coefficient of each of the spreads' determinants j = (1…k), and < # is a random error term. We estimate equation (2) We approximate global risk conditions using the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), a variable used by several previous studies (Beber et al., 2009; Afonso et al.,2015) to gauge the international risk factor. The data is obtained from
Bloomberg. An increase in vix is expected to result in higher spread values. Developments in global risk involve low pre-crisis values, followed by significant increases between 2007 and 2012 and a gradual return towards pre-crisis values thereafter (see Figure A1 in the Appendix).
BA denotes the 10-year government bond bid-ask spread, sourced from Bloomberg, used to capture liquidity effects (Favero et al., 2010; Gerlach et al., 2010) . A higher value of BA indicates a fall in bond market liquidity, and is expected to lead to an increase in government bond yield spreads. The almost zero bid-ask spreads between 1999 and 2007 reflect the ample liquidity of the pre-crisis period. A significant deterioration in liquidity conditions ensued, associated with the global financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis, which affected more strongly the periphery group. Since mid-2012, periphery bid-ask spreads declined significantly but, on average, still exceed their pre-crisis level. 10 The distinction between these two groups is common in the literature. See, among others, Afonso et al. (2014) , Paniagua et al. (2016) and Garcia and Werner (2016) . Finally, we measure credit risk using two forward-looking variables: First, the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), available from
Eurostat. The sentiment index is a weighted average of five sectoral indexes, whose scores are gathered from surveys stating agents' assessment of the current economic situation and their expectations about future developments. As such, the sentiment index is used in the literature as a forward-looking variable capturing growth expectations (Monfort and Renne, 2013; Dewachter et al., 2015) . Higher esi values signal lower credit risk and are therefore expected to result into lower spread levels. Second, the one-year ahead expected general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED), provided by the European Commission's Economic Forecasts. The use of expected, as opposed to historical fiscal data, is in line with previous studies on the determinants of spreads (Attinasi et al., 2009; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012 Table 1 suggest that the substantial reductions in spreads observed since the OMT announcement do not coincide with a similar improvement in national macro/fiscal fundamentals. This is a prima-facie evidence supporting the multiple equilibria theoretical models of the European sovereign debt crisis discussed in the introduction.
For the second part of our econometric analysis, i.e. the modelling of the spread's timevarying responses to the factors described above, we require measures of conventional and unconventional monetary policy, as well as banking risk. Conventional monetary policy is approximated using the change in the main policy rate of the ECB, namely the main refinancing operations rate (ΔMRO). Unconventional monetary policy is captured by the growth (logarithmic difference) in the amount of securities held by the ECB for monetary policy purposes (Δshmp), as reported in the ECB's weekly financial statements. The ECB's securities holdings, data for which is available since July 2009 only, have also been used by Gibson et al. (2016) and Delatte et al. (2017) , among others, to capture the effect of nonstandard monetary measures adopted by the ECB during the crisis. To construct a monthly series for securities holdings, we use the relevant figure quoted in each month's last weekly consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem, published by the ECB (assets side, item 7.1). The resulting series is presented in Figure 2 and depicts the significant expansion of the ECB's balance sheet effected in the context of the SMP and, much more so, the QE programme. At the same time, Figure We also use an intercept dummy variable to reflect the effect of the OMT announcement on the relationship between spreads and fundamentals. The dummy variable (D OMT ) is equal to 1 since August 2012 and 0 otherwise. Finally, we capture banking sector risk in the euro area using two banking CDS indices published by Markit. The indexes respectively cover 25 senior (CDS senior) and junior subordination (CDS subordinate) European banks. The use of CDS data to measure bank credit risk is consistent with several previous studies (Acharya et al., 2014; Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Drechsler et al., 2016) . The relevant data is presented in Figure 3 . It confirms the strong correlation between banking and sovereign risk, as both measures of banking risk mirror the movements of spreads reported in Figure 1 .
11
Specifically, both CDS indexes are close to zero before the financial crisis, but increase since summer 2007, reaching a maximum at the end of 2011, and decline, albeit to a level higher than their pre-crisis mean, since summer 2012. In baseline estimates of equation (2), we use the lagged CDS senior index, while in robustness checks we employ the CDS subordinate index.
Empirical findings

Modelling spreads using a time-varying panel approach
TVP estimates and pricing regimes
The TVP estimates of equation (1) Germany decreased, and thereby captures some kind of mispricing of credit risk. However, this is consistent with portfolio re-allocation from core country bonds towards Germany, which operated as a safe-haven for investors during the crisis. Nevertheless, Figure 5 suggests that for the vast majority of observations the negative debt TVP coefficient is statistically insignificant. Expected relative growth maintains a negative and significant coefficient well into the third regime, albeit with a declining absolute value. For the full panel, statistical significance is maintained until the end of 2014; for core countries until summer 2013 and for periphery calculated using the wild bootstrap methodology. These can be regarded as outliers produced by the bootstrapping exercise, with no impact on the reliability of our results: the standard calculation of a CI involves use of a parameter's point estimate as the central point of the CI estimation and calculation of the CI around the point estimate. This ensures that the point estimate always falls within the estimated CI bounds. Bootstrap methods, on the other hand, follow a different CI estimation approach, involving multiple estimates of the parameter in question (in our case 1000, one per bootstrap iteration) and the empirical setting of an upper and lower CI bound within which 95 per cent (or any other predetermined proportion) of these estimates fall. In this methodology of CI construction, it is possible for a parameter's point estimate to fall outside the empirically constructed CI. Indeed, for a 95 per cent CI calculated using our bootstrapping methodology, the a priori expectation is that the point estimate will fall outside the calculated CI in 5 per cent of observations. countries until summer 2015. By the end of our sample, esi takes near-zero and insignificant values in all three panels. Finally, the TVP coefficient of expected relative debt ratio registers a sharp decline in mid-2012 in the full panel, becoming statistically insignificant in mid-2013. However, starting from early 2014 the ED coefficient resumes an upwards movement.
This falls short of being statistically significant at the 95% level, although it is close to being so. The movements of the ED coefficient in the full panel are mainly driven by the periphery group, although the increase towards the end of our sample is also recorded for core countries. Second, to address any endogeneity concerns, we repeated the estimation of equation (1) using the first lag rather than the contemporaneous values of the independent variables. We report the full panel results in Figure A2 in the Appendix. They are consistent with the findings reported above. The same applies to the core and periphery panels.
13 Third, we have tested the robustness of our findings to changes in the value of the bandwidth estimation parameter h. Specifically, we estimated equation (1) 
Discussion
Overall, our TVP analysis confirms the existence of the pre-crisis and crisis bond-pricing regimes identified by previous studies on the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the euro area. In addition to these regimes, however, we find evidence of a third regime introduced in the second part of 2012. Apart from the study by Delatte et al. (2017) , the previous literature on regime-dependent sovereign bond pricing has not analysed the implications of the OMT announcement and more generally the role of ECB policy interventions. That study concludes that the change in the regime following the announcement represents a restoration of the regime that was in place prior to the crisis. This inference, however, is not consistent with the movements of spreads since August 2012, which by comparison to the pre-crisis regime are on average higher; and have stabilized at levels noticeably higher, and more variable across countries, (see Figure 1 and Panel A of Table 1 ). These stylized facts imply that the third regime is not identical to the pre-crisis regime, but a new, distinct regime, where markets are pricing sources of risk that were: (a)
either less penalized by markets, or (b) not priced at all during the pre-crisis period.
With regards to the former argument, our analysis above confirmed that during a substantial part of the third regime, markets continued to price fundamentals in way that was less pronounced compared to the second regime but more pronounced compared to the first.
Furthermore, liquidity risk in periphery countries continues to be priced at the end of our sample and the same may hold for expected relative debt ratios, whose TVP coefficient is close to being significant at the 5% level for the full panel. As far as the latter argument is concerned, valuable insights are provided by the time effects in equation (1). Time effects capture the net impact of country-invariant factors that may increase or decrease spreads over time beyond the level predicted by the model's explanatory variables. Hence, if non-zero, they will signal the importance of factors other than global financial risk, liquidity risk and credit risk.
The time effects for the core and periphery panels are presented in Figure 9 . In both panels, during the pre-crisis regime time effects were near zero. Time effects become much more important during the crisis period. Between summer 2007 and late 2011, they take increasingly negative values. This implies that over that period, spreads would have been even higher in the absence of mitigating factors pushing spreads below fundamentals-consistent values. 15 Such factors include the provision of programmes of financial assistance to those countries mostly affected by the crisis (Greece, Portugal and Ireland), and the introduction of institutional innovations such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), whose primary target was to set in place a previously non-existing fiscal back-stop at the union level.
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These mitigating influences started to disappear in early 2012, especially in periphery countries, as suggested by the sharply increasing time effects in Figure 9 . Greece, Italy and Spain recorded significant spread increases in spring 2012. These tensions may reflect a negative view by market participants about the adequacy of measures taken up to that point to fully and successfully resolve the crisis. Crucially, the EMU had not set in place a mechanism endowed with enough resources to fund rescue programmes in case they were needed to stabilize notably the Italian and Spanish bond markets and banking systems. With Italian and Spanish spreads already in the range of 500 basis points, this dynamic, if left unchecked, could result into a collapse of Italian and Spanish bond markets, representing an imminent threat to the existence of the euro.
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It is precisely this threat the ECB sought to address by announcing the OMT programme.
The ECB offered a guarantee that no EMU country would be left to leave the euro and change its euro-denominated bonds into bonds denominated in a new (and largely devalued) national currency. 18 This guarantee changed the bond pricing regime, resulting into lower spread values. Nevertheless, this did not happen immediately. Although spreads entered a downward path immediately after the OMT announcement, Figure 9 suggests that time effects in the periphery panel kept on rising until the end of 2013. Thereafter, they declined only gradually. We interpret this as evidence of residual redenomination risk carried over from the crisis period. This interpretation is consistent with De Santis (2015) who finds that following the OMT announcement redenomination risk declined but remained at positive levels.
In addition, the time effects estimated for the periphery panel including Greece provide further evidence in favour of the redenomination risk interpretation. Unlike time effects excluding Greece, the series depicts an upward movement since mid-2014, reaching a maximum in June 2015, at the peak of Greece's confrontation with its official lenders.
Thereafter, the series stabilizes but at significantly positive values. 19 As the possibility of Greece exiting the EMU increased in 2015, the argument that the time effects reported for the post-OMT period mainly capture redenomination risk gains further credibility. This is an important differentiating factor between the first (pre-crisis) and third (post-OMT) pricing 17 As Di Cesare et al. (2012) point out, concerns about a possible break-up of the euro area became widespread by late spring/early summer 2012. The volume of Google searches of "euro break-up" or similar keywords using peaked, while a survey of central bank reserve managers by the UBS bank revealed that about three quarters of them expected at least one country to leave the euro area within five years. 18 ECB officials have publicly stated that one of the targets of the unconventional policy interventions was to reduce redenomination risk (Krishnamurthy et al., 2015) . Apart from President Draghi's "whatever it takes to preserve the euro" speech of 26 July 2012, other examples include the speech by ECB Executive Board Member Benoît Coeuré on 3 September 2013 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130902.en.html), where he discussed redenomination risk in the context of the OMT. 19 Overall, Figure 9 provides strong evidence to support Greece's significant idiosyncratic features relative to the rest of the periphery countries, justifying our choice to exclude it from our baseline periphery panel.
regimes. Redenomination risk did not exist in the former but existed for the best part of the latter. This helps to explain the difference in average spread values observed between the two regimes.
ECB policy, banking risk and bond pricing regimes
In this section, we investigate the link between monetary policy, banking risk and bond pricing regimes. We start by modelling the point estimates of the TVP coefficients obtained in the first stage of our analysis on an intercept dummy variable capturing the effect of the OMT announcement, as well as ECB policy measures and bank credit risk. 20 The sample period for this analysis is August 2009 -July 2016, covering the third and second (partially) bond pricing regimes identified in the first stage, and is dictated by non-availability of data on the ECB's securities holdings prior to July 2009. Table 2 presents OLS estimates of equation (2) with Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Panel A refers to the full set of countries,
while Panels B and C present the results for the core and periphery groups, respectively.
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The findings in column 1 of Table 2 -Panel A correspond to the specification where only the OMT dummy variable is used to explain the TVP coefficients of the full panel group (the dummy variable is equal to 1 since August 2012 and 0 otherwise). They show that in most instances the OMT effect is statistically significant at the 5% level, or lower, and its sign consistent with lower sensitivity of spreads to fundamentals. Evidence for the core and periphery groups in Panels B and C, respectively, is also consistent with a weaker response of spreads to the risk factors since summer 2012. An exception is the reaction of spreads to liquidity conditions in the periphery panel, which becomes stronger, with the point estimate of the TVP coefficient of BA more than doubling. The OMT dummy has a positive sign in the case of the core group's expected relative debt, which we interpret as evidence for correction of the mispricing that occurred during the second regime, while consistently depicting a negative sign for the periphery group.
We then add in equation (2) the lagged growth of securities held by the ECB for monetary policy purposes, a proxy for non-conventional interventions, and the lagged change in the MRO, a measure of conventional monetary policy shifts. The results in column 2 of Table 2 show that including these variables does not alter the findings pertaining to the OMT effects.
20 All the TVP coefficients are stationary according to the Lee and Strazicich (2003) unit root test, which allows for structural breaks in the series' deterministic components. The regressors included in the right-hand side of equation (2) are also stationary series. The results of these tests are available upon request. 21 Note that Greece is excluded from both the full panel and the panel of periphery countries. (1) associated with the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (β t vix ), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (β t BA ), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (β t esi ), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (β t ED ). The set of explanatory variables includes a dummy variable that is equal to 1 since August 2012 and 0 otherwise (D t OMT ), the lagged first difference of the logarithm of securities held for monetary policy purposes by the ECB (Δshmp t-1 ), the first difference of the ECB main refinancing operations rate (ΔMRO t-1 ), and the lagged European banking sector senior subordination CDS index (CDS t-1 ). The full panel (Panel  A) The evidence highlights the important role of non-conventional monetary policy actions since the growth of the ECB's security holdings is statistically significant in many instances.
The sign of the estimated coefficients indicates that the expansion of the ECB's balance sheet is typically associated with lower sensitivity of spreads to liquidity risk and credit risk, when the latter is proxied by expected relative growth. This result holds for the full panel, as well as the core and periphery groups. On the other hand, the effect of conventional monetary policy actions is statistically insignificant at the 5% level in all cases.
Finally, motivated by the evidence in Delatte et al. (2017) about the importance of bank credit risk as a source of time variation in the relationship between spreads and fundamentals, we add the lagged European banking sector senior subordination CDS index to the set of explanatory variables in equation (2). The results are presented in column 3 of Table 2 . They show that bank credit risk is an important driver of the TVP coefficients, with the adjusted R 2 rising by 25% on average, across the various specifications. An increase in bank credit risk is typically associated with larger (in absolute magnitude) point estimates, indicating heightened sensitivity of spreads to fundamentals, and the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The only consistent exception to this general rule involves the impact of bank risk on the coefficient of the expected relative debt ratio. As far as the other coefficients are concerned, the results in columns 1 and 2, which do not account for developments in the banking sector, remain broadly robust to the inclusion of the bank credit risk measure in column 3. Similar findings are obtained when the European banking sector junior subordination CDS index is used as a proxy for banking risk. 22 Overall, the evidence in Table 2 , the lagged first difference of the logarithm of securities held for monetary policy purposes by the ECB (Δshmp t-1 ), the first difference of the ECB main refinancing operations rate (ΔMRO t-1 ), the lagged logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix t-1 ), the lagged first difference of the logarithm of the euro area Economic Sentiment Index (Δeesi t-1 ), and the lagged respective CDS index (CDS t-1 ). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . 23 Hence, we proceed by modelling our empirical measures of bank credit risk on the OMT announcement dummy, the two variables that capture conventional and nonconventional monetary policy developments and several control variables. The latter include the first lag of vix, growth expectations and bank credit risk.
The results are reported in Table 3 . The OMT effect is negative and statistically significant, capturing a decline in bank credit risk associated with the OMT announcement.
This finding is consistent with the results of Fratzscher et al. (2014) . The lagged growth of ECB security holdings is strongly significant too. It displays a negative coefficient, indicating that non-conventional monetary policy interventions led to lower banking risk. These effects are more pronounced in the equations modelling the subordinate CDS. The impact of lagged MRO changes on bank credit risk, however, is statistically insignificant. Therefore, the evidence again stresses the significance of non-conventional monetary policy.
Summarising, this section presents strong evidence that the announcement of the OMT programme influenced the mechanism linking spreads to global financial risk, liquidity risk and credit risk. The expansion of the ECB's balance sheet provided extra stimulus and further weakened the link between spreads and fundamentals. Importantly, the impact of policy interventions is both direct and indirect, the latter materialising through reductions in bank credit risk. The direct effect suggests that the OMT and purchases of sovereign bonds in the secondary market improved expectations by signalling that the ECB stands ready to prevent the collapse of sovereign bond markets due to existing fiscal liabilities. The indirect effect hints that the ECB reassured investors that sovereigns will not be called upon to finance unsustainable contingent fiscal liabilities originating from extensive bank losses.
Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that ECB policy interventions can affect the model used by markets to price EMU sovereign bonds. Our empirical strategy consists of two steps. First, we use a TVP panel methodology to model the ten-year government bond yield spread against Germany of ten EMU countries on proxies of international financial risk liquidity risk and credit risk over the period January 1999 to July 2016. Second, we estimate the impact of ECB interventions on the time-varying sensitivity of spreads to each risk factor, controlling for the effects of bank credit risk.
Our work brings together multiple branches of the literature on the European sovereign debt crisis. Our main findings are as follows. First, we present evidence consistent with the predictions of theoretical models regarding multiple equilibria and the role of shifts in expectations. Second, we find that the announcement of OMT in August 2012 was a game changer for the evolution of the European debt crisis, as it led to new bond-pricing regime.
This regime is characterised by a weakened link between spreads and fundamentals, but with higher spreads relative to the pre-crisis era and a residual redenomination risk, carried over from the crisis regime, in the periphery countries. Third, we show that ECB policy interventions affect the relationship between spreads and fundamentals not only directly, but also indirectly, working through the bank credit risk channel.
The OMT announcement and the expansion of the ECB's balance sheet through purchases of sovereign bonds expressed the commitment of the ECB to preserve the single currency and enabled markets to exit the crisis regime. This assessment, however, comes with two important caveats. The first is that as unconventional monetary policy measures have played a significant role in supporting euro area sovereign bonds, their reversal in the future may cause renewed market turbulence. The second is that the downward pressure on sovereign borrowing costs could be a source of moral hazard in fiscal and structural reforms.
On this important question, opinions are divided: some authors, including Claeys and Leandro (2016) arrive at reassuring conclusions, whereas other contributions, including Sinn (2014) and Deutche Bundesbank (2016) , strike a much more sceptical tone. Given its farreaching implications, the question merits considerable attention on behalf of academic authors. Meanwhile, and as long as the jury is still out, the prudent policy approach would be not to discount the risks of financial instability and moral hazard. 
